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STATUS OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 
C Rautenbach*
1 Introduction 
 
The state law of South Africa consists of the common law1 and the customary law.2 
However, in reality there exist various cultural and religious communities who lead 
their private lives outside of state law.3 For example, the Muslim community in South 
Africa is a close-knit community which lives according to their own customs and 
usages.4 Muslims are subject to informal religious tribunals whose decisions and 
orders are neither recognised nor reviewable by the South African courts.5
The non-recognition of certain aspects of Muslim personal law causes unnecessary 
hardships, especially for women.
  
6
                                                 
*  North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus), South Africa. 
 A Muslim woman is often in a "catch two" 
situation. For example, on the one hand her attempts to divorce her husband in terms 
of Muslim law may be foiled by the relevant religious tribunal and, on the other hand, 
1  The common law of South Africa is a conglomerate of Roman-Dutch law and English law as 
modified by legislation. 
2  Customary law is the law of the traditional communities in South Africa. It deals primarily with 
relationships on a horizontal level, ie relationships between private individuals. The status of 
customary law has been acknowledged by the Constitutional Court in Bhe v Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v President of the 
Republic of South Africa (to date unrep case no CCT 49/03; CCT 69/03; CCT 50/03 delivered on 
15 October 2004). 
3  For a discussion on non-state law in South Africa, see the essays contained in Schärf and Nina 
(eds) The Other Law. 
4  See Moosa Shaping Muslim Law for a discussion of the existence of Muslim personal law within 
the sphere of non-state law in South Africa. As far back as 1907 there were calls for the 
recognition of other personal legal systems, such as Muslim personal law. See Moosa Analysis 
41. 
5  The Muslim community is dominated by the Ulama whose authority is only binding upon 
Muslim adherents.  
6  For a discussion of these hardships, see Rautenbach 2003 QUTLJJ 168-169 and also Gabru 2004 
PER http://www.puk.ac.za/law/per/ 1 Dec.  
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the South African courts may not provide the necessary relief, because they might not 
recognise the validity of her Muslim marriage.7
Increasingly, South African courts are faced with complex issues regarding the 
Muslim community.
  
8 The last few years there has been a definite change in the courts' 
attitude with regard to the recognition of certain aspects of Muslim personal law. 
Contrary to pre-1994 court cases, the recent court cases attempt to develop the 
common law to give recognition to certain aspects of Muslim personal law.9
Another issue, which eventuates from the current situation, is whether the South 
African legal order should continue to have a dualistic legal order or whether we 
should opt for a unified legal order or even a pluralistic legal order.
 This 
article attempts to give an overview of the recent case law that dealt with issues 
regarding the recognition of aspects of Muslim personal law.  
10
                                                 
7  In this regard s 5A of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 might be of assistance. It reads: "If it appears to 
a court in divorce proceedings that despite the granting of a decree of divorce by the court the 
spouses or either one of them will, by reason of the prescripts of their religion or the religion of 
either one of them, not be free to remarry unless the marriage is also dissolved in accordance with 
such prescripts or unless a barrier to the remarriage of the spouse concerned is removed, the court 
may refuse to grant a decree of divorce unless the court is satisfied that the spouse within whose 
power it is to have the marriage so dissolved or the said barrier so removed, has taken all the 
necessary steps to have the marriage so dissolved or the barrier to the remarriage of the other 
spouse removed or the court may make any other order that it finds just." In Amar v Amar 1999 3 
SA 604 (W) 606 the court held that the purpose of s 5A is to "create mechanisms whereby 
recalcitrant spouses can be encouraged or even pressurised into granting religious divorces where 
these are necessary to enable a spouse to remarry." The court found that the acts of the husband in 
casu were to withhold the get in order to compel his wife to amend an agreement between them 
and held that the most effective way to procure the co-operation of the husband to obtain a Jewish 
divorce would be to order the husband to pay maintenance to his wife until their marriage was 
also dissolved in terms of Jewish law. However, the section might be of no assistance to couples 
whose religious marriage is unrecognised in terms of South African law. They would not be able 
to approach a court for a divorce, because in order to obtain a divorce your marriage must be 
valid. See also Bonthuys 2000 SALJ 8-16 and Van Schalkwyk 2000 DJ 186-190 for a discussion 
of the facts of the case. See Barker 1998 DR 55-56 for a discussion of his reservations on s 5A of 
the act. 
 In order to 
8  See Gabru 2004 PER http://www.puk.ac.za/law/per/ 1 Dec for a discussion of the practical 
problems Muslim women experience on a daily level. 
9  See par 3. 
10  Cachalia Muslim Family Law 31 et seq discusses three "models", which he refers to as "legal 
unity", "legal integration" and "legal pluralism". The first model presumes a single unified system 
that allows cultural and religious differences. For example, a code of marriage laws could provide 
for a minimum set of requirements for all marriages in South Africa whilst providing for the 
essential elements of a Muslim marriage. The second model doesn't impose one unified law, but 
makes provision for the integration of the legal principles of various legal systems. The 
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address this issue, some comments on the current status of Muslim personal law will 
be made and, finally, in order to contribute to the debate regarding the recognition of 
Muslim personal law, optional models for the recognition of Muslim personal law 
will briefly be evaluated. 
The author is fully aware of the complexity and sensitivity of the various issues with 
regard to the status of Muslim personal law in South Africa. This article does not 
profess to be a comprehensive and detailed discussion of the various issues 
concerned. It merely comments on some of the issues as identified in the court cases 
and finally attempts to give a brief analysis of various models for the future 
recognition of aspects of Muslim personal law. 
 
2 Muslim personal law in context 
The South African Law Reform Commission has been involved in the investigation of 
Muslim personal law since 1990.11 The first project committee that was appointed did 
not make much progress with the investigation. The reasons for the delay are not very 
clear. It seems that the finalisation of the Constitution12
In 1996 the South African Law Reform Commission showed renewed interest in the 
investigation. It decided to accord the investigation a high priority rating and 
recommended the appointment of a project committee. During March 1997 the South 
African Law Reform Commission held two workshops in order to involve members 
 and a divergence of opinion 
on contentious issues are some of the reasons that could be advanced. The South 
African Law Reform Commission did not publish any of its findings for discussion. 
                                                                                                                                            
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act may serve as an example of such a model. The third 
model denotes the formal incorporation of different systems of personal law within one legal 
order. The position in India may serve as an example of such a model.  
11  Project 59. 
12  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
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of the public and interested parties. From 78 nominations received, the previous 
minister of Justice appointed a new project committee. 
The new project committee under the leadership of Justice Navsa issued its first 
discussion document at the end of May 2000, namely Issue Paper 15.13
At the end of 2001 the South African Law Reform Commission published Discussion 
Paper 101.
 According to 
the South African Law Reform Commission its aim is to: 
… investigate the legal recognition of Islamic Marriages and other aspects of 
Islamic Personal Law. 
14 The closing date for comment was 31 January 2002. The discussion 
document contained a proposed Draft Bill on Islamic Marriages.15 The Draft Bill 
makes provision for, inter alia, the recognition of Muslim marriages in South 
Africa,16 the requirements for a valid Muslim marriage,17 the registration,18 
proprietary consequences19 and dissolution20 of Muslim marriages and the status and 
capacity of spouses in Muslim marriages.21 All responses received up to and 
including 10 April 2000 were published by the South African Law Reform 
Commission in a special document referred to as "Collation of Submissions on 
Discussion Paper 101: Islamic and Related Matters".22
                                                 
13  SALC Islamic Marriages and Related Matters (Project 59). The closing date for comment on the 
issue paper was the end of July 2000. Although it is not normal for the SALC to respond to 
submissions prior to the release of a discussion paper, it released a document containing some of 
the responses and the names of the respondents to Issue Paper 15. SALC Responses 
 The responses were considered 
by the South African Law Reform Commission and the result was an amended 
http://www.law.wits.ac.za/salc/issue/issue.html 1 Nov. 
14  SALC Islamic Marriages and Related Matters (Discussion Paper 101) 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/discussn/discussn.html 1 Nov. 
15  SALC Islamic Marriages and Related Matters (Discussion Paper 101) 49. 
16  Cl 4. 
17  Cl 5. 
18  Cl 6. 
19  Cl 8. 
20  Cl 14. 
21  Cl 3. 
22  SALC Collation of Submissions 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/salc/discussn/collationdp101.doc 1 Nov. 
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version of the Draft Bill23 which was included in a report24 submitted to the Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development in July 2003.25
The Draft Bill, although it underwent considerable changes, is applicable to a Muslim 
marriage only if the parties elected it to be applicable to their marriage.
  
26 The Draft 
Bill also addresses the situation where parties were married before the 
commencement of the act27 and where the parties were involved in civil or customary 
marriages.28 The Draft Bill affords equal status to Muslim spouses29 and prescribes 
the proprietary consequences of a Muslim marriage.30 The Draft Bill further addresses 
the registration of Muslim marriages,31 the dissolution of Muslim marriages,32 
custody of and access to minor children33 and maintenance.34
The general viewpoint is that the Draft Bill will alleviate the hardships that existed as 
a result of non-recognition of Muslim marriages. Although concerns exist regarding 
the non-support of the Draft Bill amongst some groupings of the Muslim community, 
it is generally accepted that it will eventually create certainty regarding the validity of 
 
                                                 
23  Currently referred to as the Draft Bill on Muslim Marriages (the name changed from Islamic 
marriages to Muslim marriages).  
24  SALC Report on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters 110-133.  
25  The submission of the report to the minister was in terms of s 7(1) of the South African Law 
Reform Commission Act 19 of 1973. 
26  Cl 2(1). Cl 5 lists the requirements for a valid Muslim marriage. 
27  Cl 2(2) – the act will be applicable to previous Muslim marriages unless the parties elected not to 
be bound by the provisions of the act. 
28  Cl 2(4)(a) lays down that the act only applies to an existing civil marriage, if the parties elected it 
to be applicable; cl 2(4)(b) lay down that it does not apply to a civil marriage concluded after 
commencement of the act and cl 2(4)(c) lays down that it does not apply to a customary marriage 
registered in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
29  Cl 3. The act does not purport to regulate the legal status of Muslim men and women in general. 
30  Contrary to a civil marriage, which is in community of property unless an antenuptial contract 
stipulated otherwise, a Muslim marriage is out of community of property – see cl 8. 
31  In terms of cl 8 Muslim marriages concluded before and after the commencement of the act must 
be registered. However, failure to register such marriage does not affect the validity of the 
marriage. 
32  In terms of cl 9 the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 applies to the dissolution of the marriage and includes 
dissolution on any ground permitted by Muslim law. 
33  Cl 11. 
34  Cl 12. 
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Muslim marriages, and that it will give effect to Muslim values.35
3 Viewpoints of the courts 
 To date no 
legislation with regard to Muslim personal law have been enacted. 
Until the legislation, as proposed in the Draft Bill, has been enacted the South African 
courts will be the forum to approach, if aggrieved Muslim parties want alleviation of 
the hardships caused by non-recognition of the validity of their marriages. So far the 
courts are continually approached by aggrieved Muslim parties who cannot wait for 
legislative reform in order to improve their current situation. In view of the fact that 
Muslim personal law (to date) receives no legislative recognition, these cases had to 
resort to the common law in order to seek ways to protect the interests of the 
aggrieved parties who approached them. In the following paragraph some of these 
decisions will be discussed. 
 
In terms of sections 8(3) and 39(2) of the Constitution the courts have the power to 
develop the common law. Such development "must promote the spirit, purport, and 
objects of the Bill of Rights." Up to 1997 the courts have refused to develop the 
common law in order to afford legal protection to parties involved in a Muslim 
marriage because Muslim marriages are potentially polygamous and, therefore, contra 
bonos mores and invalid.36 Today, however, various sections in the Constitution 
guarantee rights and freedoms based on culture and religion.37
                                                 
35  SouthAfrica.info 
 These "new" values 
embedded in the Constitution are reflected in the recent judgments of our courts that 
used their newly acquired development function to develop the South African 
common law in order to recognise some aspects of Muslim personal law.  
http://www.southafrica.info/women/islamicmarriages.htm 1 Nov. 
36  Rautenbach 2003 QUTLJJ 169. 
37  For a discussion of these rights and freedoms, see Rautenbach, Jansen van Rensburg and Pienaar 
2003 PER http://www.puk.ac.za/law/per 1 Nov. 
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The first case that deviated from a long line of decisions which were all against the 
recognition of Muslim marriages was Ryland v Edros.38 The court was prepared to 
develop the common law to give recognition to the contractual consequences of a 
Muslim marriage.39 Mr Ryland (the plaintiff) and Ms Edros (the defendant) entered 
into a de facto monogamous Muslim marriage that did not comply with the provisions 
of the Marriage Act40 and which was, therefore, invalid in terms of South African 
law. Plaintiff divorced defendant by serving the talaq41 on her. Then he instituted an 
action in court to evict her from the house that they shared as husband and wife. 
Defendant defended the action and instituted a counter-claim for arrear 
maintenance,42 a consolatory gift43 and an equitable portion of the growth of 
applicant's estate.44
Farlam j pointed out that two preliminary questions
 She based her claim on the "contractual agreement" constituted by 
their Muslim marriage.  
45 had to be answered, namely 
whether it was appropriate for the court to pronounce upon religious matters46 and, 
secondly, whether the Ismail case47
                                                 
38  Ryland v Edros 1997 1 BCLR 77 (C). The case was decided when the 1993 Constitution was still 
in force. However, s 14 of the 1993 Constitution is similar to s 15 of the Constitution, and the 
decision is still relevant to the interpretation of the Constitution. See also Rautenbach 2003 Koers 
136-140. 
 prevented the parties from relying on the marriage 
contract that formed the basis of their Muslim marriage.  
39  See 696C-697G for the facts of the case. 
40  Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
41  Talaq refers to the dissolution of a valid marriage contract by means of using the word talaq or a 
synonym thereof. A talaq pronounced by a husband may be two-fold: revocable and irrevocable. 
See Moosa Divorce 67. Definitions for irrevocable talaq and revocable talaq are also contained in 
cl 1 of the Draft Bill on the Recognition of Muslim Marriages defines talaq as "the dissolution of 
a Muslim marriage, forwith or at a later stage, by a husband, or his wife or agent, duly authorised 
by him or her to do so, using the word Talaq or a synonym or derivative thereof in any language, 
and includes the pronouncement of a Talaq pursuant to a Tafwid al-Talaq." The Draft Bill also 
distinguishes between the definitions of an irrevocable and a revocable talaq. 
42 For the period of their marriage. 
43  Applicant alleged that the divorce was without just cause, at 696G. 
44  Applicant alleged that she contributed labour, effort and money to her husband's estate and that 
she is, therefore, entitled to an equitable portion thereof, at 696H. 
45  701G-702A. 
46  Farlam j refers to it as the "doctrine of entanglement". 
47  Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A). 
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With regard to the first question Farlam j pointed out that the courts, in the past, did 
not involve themselves in religious matters "unless some proprietary or other legally 
recognised right was involved".48 He argued that section 14 of the 1993 Constitution49 
might have changed the position and that the doctrine of entanglement might now be 
part of South African law. However, since the representatives of the parties agreed 
that the present issues did not require the interpretation of religious issues, there was 
no question of doctrinal entanglement and it was, therefore, not necessary for the 
court to deal with the question.50
With regard to the second question Farlam j held that public policy was a question of 
fact.
 
51 Because public policy is based on facts, it can only change if there is a change 
in the facts on which it is based. Since the 1993 Constitution introduced considerable 
changes in the factual position of public policy in South African law, it was possible 
to revise the Ismail case. If the "spirit, purport and objects" of the 1993 Constitution 
and the basic values underlying it were in conflict with the view regarding public 
policy, as expressed in the Ismail case, then the values underlying the 1993 
Constitution had to prevail.52 After assessing the underlying values of the 1993 
Constitution the views regarding public policy as expressed in the Ismail case, the 
court came to the conclusion that it could not be said that the contract arising from a 
Muslim marriage was "contrary to the accepted customs and usages which are 
regarded as morally binding upon all members of our society" or that it was 
"fundamentally opposed to our principles and institutions" as expressed in the Ismail 
case53
                                                 
48  703E. Quoted from Allen v Gibbs 1977 3 SA 212 (SE) 218A-B. 
 and said: 
49  The wording of s 13 of the 1993 Constitution is similar to the wording of s 15 of the 1996 
Constitution.  
50 703B-J. It may, however, be argued that the court did indeed interpret religious issues by 
choosing the evidence of one expert witness over the other on the issue of division of property 
between the parties (715-714). 
51  704B. He referred to the 1993 Constitution, which was the beginning of the new South African 
constitutional dispensation. According to Mahomed 1997 DR 189 it is clear that the concept of 
public policy is not a vague and arbitrary concept ie "… open to abuse by an executive-minded 
judiciary. Rather it operates within definite parameters and is guided by the interpretation 
provision …" of the 1993 Constitution. 
52  705. 
53  707E (own emphasis). 
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[I]t is quite inimical to all the values of the new South Africa for one group 
to impose its values on another and that the Courts should only brand a 
contract as offensive to public policy if it is offensive to those values which 
are shared by the community at large, by all right-thinking people in the 
community and not only by one section of it.54
Secondly, Farlam j referred to the principles of equality, diversity and 
multiculturalism, which conform to the values of the 1993 Constitution. In his opinion 
these values "irradiate" the concept of public policy that the courts have to apply.
 
55
In my opinion the 'radiating' effect of the values underlying the new 
Constitution
 He 
differed from the viewpoint expressed in the Ismail case, namely that the contracts in 
issue were contra bonos mores and held:  
56 is such that neither of these grounds for holding the 
contractual terms under consideration in this case to be unlawful can be 
supported.57
Finally he came to the conclusion that the marriage contract between the parties was 
not contra bonos mores. As a result the Ismail case no longer "operates to preclude a 
court from enforcing claims such as those brought by" parties to an Islamic union. 
The court then proceeded to consider the counter-claim of the defendant and awarded 
her arrear maintenance after considering the facts.
 
58
                                                 
54  707G. 
 The question of whether the 
55  707H-709A. 
56  The 1993 Constitution. 
57  709C. 
58  711D-714F. The defendant claimed arrear maintenance from January 1977 (date of marriage) to 
14 January 1993 (third month after third talaq was served). The court pointed out that the parties 
concluded a contract in terms of which they agreed that their marriage would be governed by 
Islamic law. It was common cause that the rules of the Shafi'i school are relevant in this case. 
Under the Shafi'i school the plaintiff is obliged to maintain his wife during their marriage and for 
a period of three months after talaq. It is therefore clear that plaintiff and defendant agreed (in 
terms of their marriage contract) that plaintiff would maintain defendant during their marriage 
and for three months after talaq, and that any unpaid maintenance would accumulate as a debt, 
and that prescription of such a debt would not be possible. The court held, however, that 
prescription is for the benefit of the general public and that an agreement to renounce prescription 
(as in this case) would be against public policy. Therefore, plaintiff is only liable to pay 
maintenance to defendant for the period from 25 October 1991 (ie three years before defendant's 
counter-claim was served on plaintiff's attorneys) to 14 January 1993 (ie three months after the 
marriage was terminated by the third talaq.)  
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defendant was entitled to a consolatory gift stood over for later determination.59 
Regarding the claim for an equitable share in the plaintiff's estate, the court found that 
the defendant could not prove that such a custom existed among the Muslim 
population and that her claim had to fail.60
A different conclusion was reached in the Durban High Court in Amod v Multilateral 
Motor Vehicle Accident Fund.
 
This case is seen as one of the landmark decisions regarding the rights of Muslims in 
South Africa. Although it did not recognise the validity of a Muslim marriage, it did 
give recognition to the contractual consequences of the marriage contract between a 
Muslim husband and wife. Such recognition affords a Muslim wife protection when 
or if the marriage is dissolved. The position where there is more than one wife, that is, 
in a polygamous union, is still undecided.  
61 Mr and Ms Amod (the applicant) entered into a 
Muslim marriage, which did not comply with the requirements of the Marriage Act62
                                                 
59  714G-H. Plaintiff and defendant had to lead evidence regarding plaintiff's conduct regarding the 
divorce before the issue could be decided. 
 
and was, therefore, not regarded as a valid marriage. Mr Amod was killed in a motor 
accident and the applicant lodged a claim for compensation for loss of support by 
reason of Mr Amod's death against the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (the 
respondent). The respondent denied liability on the ground of the fact that the 
marriage between Mr Amod and the applicant was a void Muslim marriage. The 
60  Defendant's counsel argued that defendant was entitled to an equitable portion of plaintiff's estate. 
He based his argument on legislation enacted in Malaysia, namely s 58 of the Malaysian Islamic 
Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984 that confers upon a court the power to order a division 
of assets between divorcing parties (715D-717A). The court did not accept his argument and 
held: "It is clear, in my view, that the Malaysian rules are based, in part at least, on Malay custom 
which, not being in conflict with the essential principles of Islamic law, is capable of being 
synthesised therewith. In view of the fact that no other Islamic country … adopts this approach, I 
cannot see on what basis I can regard the Malaysian rules as being part of the provisions of 
Islamic personal law incorporated by the parties into their contract unless a custom similar to the 
Malay adat relating to harta sepencarian prevails among the Islamic community, to which the 
parties belong, in the Western Cape." (717B-D). 
61  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1997 12 BCLR 1716 (D). 
62  Marriage Act 25 of 1961. 
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applicant contended, however, that Mr Amod had a contractual obligation (based on 
the marriage contract) to support her.63
The question before the court was whether the respondent was legally liable to 
compensate the respondent for her loss of support. In terms of South African common 
law, such a liability would exist if Mr Amod were, during his life, under a common 
law duty to support the applicant.
  
64 However, due to the Ismail case, which held that a 
Muslim marriage was contra bonos mores, such a duty did not exist if the parties had 
been married in terms of Islamic law.65
The applicant's counsel argued, first of all, that there had been a change in public 
policy regarding the conclusion of Muslim marriages that had changed the traditional 
position. Meskin j found, however, that the onus to prove such a change rested on the 
applicant and that she could not prove that there had been a change of policy since the 
Ismail case.
 
66
Secondly, applicant's counsel argued that the court should develop the common law to 
recognise a duty to support arising out of a Muslim marriage.
  
67 Meskin j held that, 
although the facts of the case occurred before the commencement of the Constitution, 
it was in the interest of justice to apply the Constitution to the facts of the case.68 
Upon interpretation of sections 39(2),69 8(2)70 and 8(3)71
                                                 
63  In terms of the Muslim marriage, which is a contract, the husband is obliged to support and 
maintain his wife. 
 of the Constitution he came 
64  In terms of s 31 of the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963 a partner in a customary marriage 
may also claim for loss of support as a result of the death of the breadwinner. 
65  1719I. 
66  1720C. 
67  S 39(2) read with s 8(2) and (3) of the Constitution. 
68 1722E. 
69  "When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights." 
70  "A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is 
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the 
right." 
71  "When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of 
subsection (2), a court - (a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary 
develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and (b) 
may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in 
accordance with section 36 (1)." 
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to the conclusion that section 39(2) does not give a general power to the courts to 
develop the common law "to promote the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of 
Rights." The court argues that, if section 39(2) is read with sections 8(2) and (3), it is 
clear that the development of the common law the legislature had in mind is 
development  
… in order to give effect to a right in the Bill … to the extent that legislation 
does not give effect to that right' … It is not intended that the Court is to 
have a general power of development of the common law to 'promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights' independently of giving 
effect, when applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic 
person, to 'a right in the Bill … to the extent that legislation does not give 
effect to that right.72
The applicant's counsel argued that that the right to equality
  
73 that includes the right 
not to be unfairly discriminated against on the grounds of marital status or religion 
and the right to dignity are relevant to the facts of the case.74 Taking the facts of the 
case into consideration, Meskin j agreed that "a refusal to recognise the contractual 
duty of support upon which [the applicant] relies as being sufficient to ground the 
liability which she seeks to enforce constitutes, indeed, a violation" of these rights. He 
agrees that such refusal results in the unequal treatment of persons before the law, that 
is, between females lawfully married in terms of the civil law to a deceased 
breadwinner and those married illegally to a deceased breadwinner in terms of non-
recognised Muslim law. Although such refusal results in the unequal treatment before 
the law, the question is whether the court has the power to develop the common law 
by elimination of a principle that already forms part of it.75 The court read its power 
to develop the common law as restrictive, that is not to eliminate principles that 
already form a part of it. With reference to Du Plessis v De Klerk76
                                                 
72  S 8(3)(a). 1722H-J. In Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 4 BCLR 444 (T) Roux j 
held that the time has arrived for recognition of a reciprocal duty of support owed by parties to a 
same-sex union. Such recognition is in accordance with the court's duty to promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when developing the common law (448H-J). 
 Meskin j held that 
73  S 9 of the Constitution. 
74  S 10 of the Constitution. 
75  1723C-D. 
76  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) 691D-E: "The Lawgiver did not say that Courts 
should invalidate rules of common law inconsistent … or declare them unconstitutional." 
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it is the intention of section 8(3)(a) that any alteration or elimination of the common 
law should remain the function of the legislature.77 The court came to the conclusion 
that it may not alter the existing law regarding a claim for loss of support to include a 
duty to support in terms of a contractual relationship resulting from a Muslim 
marriage, and the applicant's claim was denied.78
After the decision in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund
  
79
Ms Amod (the appellant) appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal in Amod v 
Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality 
Intervening).
 had been 
delivered, the applicant applied for leave to appeal directly to the Constitutional 
Court. The Constitutional Court found that the crucial question in the application 
before the court was whether the common law should be developed to allow the 
applicant to claim damages for support. Since it was the viewpoint of the 
Constitutional Court that this question is one which falls primarily within the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the application for leave to appeal was 
dismissed. Although it could not be said that the Constitutional Court was misdirected 
in its findings, the reluctance (or caution) of the courts to apply the Bill of Rights 
directly to private relationships is illustrated.  
80 On behalf of the appellant and the Commission for Gender Equality it 
was argued that the common law rules make provision for a claim for loss of support 
of a Muslim widow. In the alternative, it was argued that, if the rules of the common 
law do not make such provision, the common law should be developed in terms of 
section 35(3) of the 1993 Constitution.81
                                                 
77  1723H-I. See Rautenbach 2003 Koers 136-140 for her criticism of the court's restrictive 
interpretation of its developmental function. 
  
78  The court distinguished the issues of this case from the issues present in Ryland v Edros 1997 2 
SA 690 (C) and correctly held on 1726E that the court in Ryland v Edros did not hold that a 
Muslim marriage is a lawful marriage or that it generated a legal duty to support a wife. 
79  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1998 4 SA 753 (CC). 
80  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund (Commission for Gender Equality 
Intervening) 1999 4 SA 119 (SCA). For a discussion of the issues raised in the case see, 
Rautenbach and Du Plessis 2000 THRHR 302-314. 
81  See par [5]. The 1993 Constitution was in effect when the action commenced in the court a quo. 
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The Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (the respondent) alleged that an 
Islamic marriage does not enjoy the same status as a civil marriage, that the duty to 
support was a "contractual consequence of the union between them and not an ex lege 
consequence of the marriage per se", and that the action for loss of support should not 
be extended to include claims for loss of support pursuant to a contractual duty to 
furnish support. The action for loss of support, it was argued, should be restricted to 
cases in which the duty of support is one of the common law consequences of a valid 
marriage.82
The court found that the appellant had a good cause of action, based on the fact that 
the deceased had a legally enforceable duty to support the appellant; the duty arose 
from a solemn marriage in accordance with the tenets of a recognised and accepted 
faith; and that it was a duty which deserved protection and recognition for the 
purposes of the dependant's action.
 
83 The question was not whether the marriage was 
lawful at common law, but whether the deceased had a duty to support the appellant 
during the subsistence of the marriage.84 The court based its findings on an "important 
shift in the identifiable boni mores of the community" that "must also manifest itself 
in a corresponding evolution in the relevant parameters of application in this area,"85 
and on the test laid down in Santam v Henery.86 The court stated that the non-
recognition of an action for loss of support in the case of a monogamous Islamic 
marriage is "inconsistent with the new ethos of tolerance, pluralism and religious 
freedom"87 and held that the respondent was liable for damages for the loss of support 
suffered by the appellant in consequence of the death of her husband.88
It is important to realise that the court did not give recognition to Muslim marriages. It 
only extended the claim of a surviving spouse (married in terms of the common law) 
 
                                                 
82  Par [16].  
83  Par [26] and [30]. 
84  Par [19]. 
85  Par [23]. 
86  Santam v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA) 427 H-J, 429 C-D, 430D-I. 
87  Par [20]. 
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for loss of support to surviving spouses married in terms of unrecognised Muslim 
personal law. The court also did not deal with polygamous Muslim marriages, and it 
is uncertain whether spouses involved in such marriages would receive similar 
protection. 
In 2003 the High Court in Daniels v Campbell,89 was invited to test, inter alia, the 
constitutionality of certain sections of the Intestate Succession Act90 and the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act91 in order to grant relief to a Muslim wife 
whose husband died intestate. Mrs Daniels (the applicant) concluded a second 
marriage with Mr Daniels in terms of Islamic law. The marriage was not registered in 
terms of the Marriage Act, but the city of Cape Town was informed of the marriage 
and in accordance with the then applicable policy the tenancy of the house, which was 
allocated to her after her divorce with her first husband, was transferred to Mr 
Daniels. Tenants of houses were later given the opportunity to purchase such houses 
and as a result Mr Daniels bought the house. The deed of sale incorrectly reflected 
that the couple was married in community of property.92
                                                                                                                                            
88  The court did not find it necessary to discuss the application of s 35(3) of the 1993 Constitution or 
s 39(2) of the Constitution, as it was able to reach its conclusion without reliance on those 
provisions – see par [30]. 
  
Mr Daniels died intestate and the house, which was his main asset, was transferred to 
his estate. Mr Daniels and the applicant had no children, but Mr Daniels had four 
children from a previous relationship. They are the fifth, sixth and seventh 
respondents and the late MC Daniels. In turn MC Daniels (who was predeceased) had 
four children, all of whom were minors when the proceedings were instituted. The 
four children's mothers and natural guardians are the third and fourth respondents. 
After the death of Mr Daniels, the late MC Daniels and the third, fifth, sixth and 
seventh respondents threatened to throw the applicant out of the house. 
89  Daniels v Campbell 2003 9 BCLR 969 (C) – hereafter referred to as the Daniels case. 
90  Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. 
91  Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. 
92  The normal consequence of a Muslim marriage is a marriage out of community.  
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The applicant approached the High Court for the first time in 1998 for an order 
declaring that she was entitled to the said house.93
The applicant then approached the High Court for a second time for an order 
declaring that she was a spouse
 The application was dismissed on 
various grounds that included, inter alia, the non-compliance of some of the 
procedural requirements by the applicant and the non-recognition of the validity of the 
Muslim marriage of Mr Daniels and the applicant. The court was also of the opinion 
that new legislation had to be promulgated in order to recognise the validity of 
Muslim marriages in South Africa. 
94 for the purposes of the Intestate Succession Act and 
that she is, therefore, an heir in his deceased estate.95 Secondly, she applied for an 
order declaring that she was a survivor96
                                                 
93  See Daniels v Campbell 2003 9 BCLR 969 (C). 
 of the deceased and that she accordingly had 
a claim for maintenance in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act. To 
cater for the possibility that the court would refuse these orders, the applicant sought 
for alternative orders which provide, firstly, for a declaration of unconstitutionality of 
certain omissions (that is surviving Muslim spouses) in the Intestate Succession Act 
and the Maintenance of the Surviving Spouses Act and, secondly, for the "reading in" 
of certain provisions into the Intestate Succession Act and the Maintenance of 
Surviving Spouses Act in order to rectify these omissions.  
94  S 1(a)-(c) of the Intestate Succession Act reads as follows: "(1) If after the commencement of this 
Act a person (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') dies intestate, either wholly or in part, and - 
(a) is survived by a spouse, but not by a descendant, such spouse shall inherit the intestate estate; 
(b) is survived by a descendant, but not by a spouse, such descendant shall inherit the intestate 
estate; (c) is survived by a spouse as well as a descendant - (i) such spouse shall inherit a child's 
share of the intestate estate or so much of the intestate estate as does not exceed in value the 
amount fixed from time to time by the Minister of Justice by notice in the Gazette, whichever is 
the greater; and (ii) such descendant shall inherit the residue (if any) of the intestate estate." Own 
emphasis. 
95  See Daniels v Campbell 2003 9 BCLR 969 (C). 
96  S 2(1) of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act states: "If a marriage is dissolved by death 
after the commencement of this act the survivor shall have a claim against the estate of the 
deceased spouse for the provision of his reasonable maintenance needs until his death or 
remarriage in so far as he is not able to provide therefor from his own means and earnings." Own 
emphasis. In terms of s 1 of the act "survivor" is defined as "the surviving spouse in a marriage 
dissolved by death."  
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Three issues arose for determination. The first issue was whether the applicant can be 
prevented to raise the issue of constitutionality with regard to her right to inherit in 
terms of the Intestate Succession Act on the grounds of the rule of res judicata, or 
alternatively, of the doctrine of estoppel? Although a previous application had been 
dismissed with costs, the court held that it could not be said that the interpretative 
and/or the constitutional issue in respect of the Intestate Succession Act was fully 
canvassed by both parties in the 1998 application, nor that the court made a final 
pronouncement in that application. As a result, the court held that first and second 
respondents reliance on res judicata and estoppel had to fail. 
The second issue was whether the word "spouse", as contained in the Intestate 
Succession Act and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act, can be interpreted to 
include a husband or wife married in terms of Muslim rites? The court reluctantly 
concluded that the word "spouse" could not be interpreted so as to include a person in 
the dire position of the applicant and held that the word "spouse" had to be given its 
"traditional, limited meaning". Van Heerden j was of the view that the word "spouse" 
only applied to spouses whose marriage was valid in terms of South African law and, 
accordingly, the two acts could not be interpreted to include the parties to a Muslim 
marriage. As a result the applicant was not a "spouse" (or "survivor") for the purposes 
of the acts.97
The third issue was whether the failure to define a husband or wife (who concluded a 
de facto monogamous Muslim marriage in accordance with Muslim rites) as a 
"spouse" the purpose of the Intestate Succession Act and the Maintenance of 
Surviving Spouses Act renders the relevant provisions of the acts unconstitutional and 
invalid and, if so, whether such invalidity can be rectified by the "reading in" of the 
provisions proposed by Mrs Daniels. The court agreed with the applicant's argument 
that the exclusion of Muslim spouses from the definition of "spouse" boils down to 
unfair discrimination on the grounds of equality, religion and culture which cannot be 
tolerated in the new constitutional order. The court could find no justification for the 
 
                                                 
97  See the comments of Goolam and Rautenbach 2004 Stell LR 372-376. 
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limitation of these rights and held that effective relief could be afforded by a suitable 
reading-in order that includes a surviving spouse to a monogamous Muslim marriage 
in the definition of spouse in the relevant acts.98
The order of the court was referred to the Constitutional Court
 
99 for confirmation in 
terms of sections 172(2)(a)100 and 167(5)101 of the Constitution.102
Without much ado, Sachs j commenced his majority judgment with the observation 
that the word "spouse" in its ordinary meaning includes parties to a Muslim marriage. 
According to him the exclusion of parties to a Muslim marriage in the past emanated 
from a linguistically strained used of the word spouse that flowed from a "culturally 
 In the 
Constitutional Court it was again argued on behalf of the applicant that a proper 
interpretation of the word "spouse" would include Muslim spouses in the position of 
the applicant. The Minister supported the confirmation of the High Court order, but 
was not prepared to concede that the word "spouse" includes a Muslim spouse. The 
executors, on the other hand, contended that the word "spouse" did not include 
Muslim spouses and further, that the relevant provisions of the Intestate Succession 
Act and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act are not unconstitutional. They 
based there contention on two facts, namely that an Imam is not barred from being 
registered as a marriage officer under the Marriage Act and is, therefore, not 
disqualified from being registered as a marriage officer and, secondly, that a Muslim 
couple has a choice to conclude a marriage that is valid in terms of South African law.  
                                                 
98  Par [82]. 
99  Daniels v Campbell 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC) at par [40]. 
100  S 172(2)(a) states: "The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of similar status may 
make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or 
any conduct of the President, but an order of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it is 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court." Own emphasis. 
101  This section reads: "The Constitutional Court makes the final decision whether an Act of 
Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional, and must confirm any 
order of invalidity made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court, or a court of similar 
status, before that order has any force." 
102  The applicant was concerned that the Constitutional Court might refuse to confirm the declaration 
of invalidity and accordingly she applied for leave to appeal against the interpretation given to the 
word "spouse", should the application for confirmation fail. The High Court was of the opinion 
that a contextual and purposive reading of the act could well lead to a different order by the 
Constitutional Court and granted conditional leave to appeal as requested by the applicant. See 
par [14]. 
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and racially hegemonic appropriation of it".103
… discriminatory, expressly exalting a particular concept of marriage, 
flowing initially from a particular world-view, as the ideal against which 
Muslim marriages were measured and found to be wanting.
 He points out that a restricted 
interpretation of the word "spouse" is: 
104
According to Sachs j the constitutional values of equality, tolerance and respect for 
diversity point strongly in favour of a broad and inclusive interpretation of the word 
"spouse".
 
105 According to Sachs j the question is not whether the applicant was 
lawfully married to the deceased, but whether the applicant is entitled to be protected 
in terms of the relevant Acts. Contextual interpretations of the Acts finally lead the 
court to conclude that the parties to a Muslim marriage are also spouses in terms of 
the Intestate Succession Act or survivors in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act. The court clearly distinguishes this viewpoint with the conclusion 
reached in the cases dealing with same-sex life partners where it were found that a 
"spouse" did not include such a partner.106
Sachs j emphasises that the "inclusive" meaning he affords to the word "spouse" does 
not mean that there is a general recognition of the consequences of a Muslim marriage 
for other purposes. In other words, the broad interpretation given to the word "spouse" 
in terms of the relevant acts has no implications for the wider question of legislative 
recognition of aspects of Muslim personal law.
  
107 He also did not deal with the 
complex issues regarding polygamous Muslim marriages.108
                                                 
103  Par [19]. 
 
104  Par [20]. 
105  Par [21]. He equates his argument with the situation in Britain where it was formerly held that the 
word "person" in certain legislation did not include women - see par [22] n 29. 
106  See par [28]. 
107 Par [26]. 
108  Par [36]. 
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The order of the High Court was set aside and replaced with a new order declaring the 
word "spouse" in the Intestate Succession Act and the word "survivor" to be broad 
enough to include a surviving partner to a monogamous Muslim marriage.109
4 Legislative recognition of Muslim personal law 
 
To date the cases that dealt with aspects of Muslim law did it on an ad hoc basis. In 
most recent cases the courts have developed the common law in order to provide for 
protection for, especially, Muslim women who turn to them for protection. Legal 
certainty and adequate protection of the rights of Muslim women could only be 
achieved by legislative recognition of Muslim personal law. Although it seems as if 
the South African Law Reform Commission has decided to opt for piecemeal 
legislation that recognises certain aspects of Muslim law, which is Muslim marriages, 
there are various possibilities of how it could be done. These possibilities will be 
explored in the following paragraphs. 
A general act, which may be referred to as the Muslim Family Law Application Act, 
could be enacted to give recognition to uncodified Muslim personal law. The Muslim 
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act110
The act could also make provision for the institution, status and role of the Ulama, 
which could function in a similar way as traditional authorities in terms of customary 
law. The act does not have to contain substantive provisions of Muslim personal law 
 in operation in India could be used as an 
example. Section 2 of the Act applies Muslim personal law to all matters regarding 
… intestate succession, special property of females, including personal 
property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of 
personal law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila, zihar, 
lian, khula and mubara'at, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and 
trust properties and wakfs (other than charities and charitable institutions and 
religious endowments). 
                                                 
109  Par [40]. 
110  Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 26 of 1937. 
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and it could be left to either the courts or legislature to develop the substantive 
provisions of Muslim personal law.111
If Muslim personal law is recognised by means of a general act the Constitution will 
be directly applicable thereto through the intervention of the legislature.
 
112 One of the 
advantages of such recognition is that Muslim personal law would be subject to the 
scrutiny of the Bill of Rights, which would ensure the striking down of 
unconstitutional rules of Muslim personal law. But approaching the courts has been a 
costly and time-consuming affair. There is also no guarantee that women who are 
discriminated against would have the means and strength to approach the courts for 
protection of their rights. If Muslim personal law is recognised in South Africa the 
question regarding jurisdiction of courts could become an important one. Would the 
existing courts have the jurisdiction to decide on matters of religion or would the 
jurisdiction of the Ulama be extended to receive binding jurisdiction similar to that of 
the courts of South Africa? It would also be a possibility to deal with the matter first 
through the Ulama, and if the parties are not satisfied with the outcome they may go 
to the South African courts (more or less the same as the current system of customary 
courts).113
Another problem emanating from the previous one has to do with the developmental 
function of the courts. In terms of sections 8(2), 39(2) and 173 the courts have the 
power to develop the common law and customary law to promote the "spirit, purport, 
and objects of the Bill of Rights." These sections make no mention of other legal 
systems that may be recognised in terms of section 15(3) of the Constitution. It is, 
therefore, doubtful whether the courts would have the power to develop Muslim 
personal law in order to promote the "spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of 
Rights". The courts would, however, be entitled to strike down a rule of Muslim 
 
                                                 
111  Something similar to the common law that could either be developed by the courts or by means of 
legislation. 
112  S 8(1) of the Constitution. The horizontal and vertical debate regarding the application of the Bill 
of Rights is irrelevant where legislative enactments are concerned. The common law is of general 
application, whilst the application of Muslim personal law will be regulated by means of 
legislation.  
113  The same question may be asked regarding the Beth Din of the Jews. 
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personal law that is unconstitutional. Declaring a rule of Muslim personal law 
unconstitutional without the power to develop such a rule would leave a vacuum in 
Muslim personal law, which could only be rectified by means of legislation or by 
developing the common law.114
5 Legislative recognition of codified Muslim personal law
 
A third problem, which could emanate from a general act recognising Muslim 
personal law, has to do with legal uncertainty. Currently in South Africa there is a 
lack of reliable sources regarding Muslim personal law. Very few universities teach 
the principles of religious legal systems and few scholars or court officials have any 
knowledge of these legal systems. It would, therefore, be risky to leave it in the hands 
of the judiciary and legal practitioners to determine the content of Muslim personal 
law in order to apply it in practice. 
 
115
Some of the problems caused by the previous proposal could be resolved by the 
codification of Muslim personal law.
 
116 Codification would ensure the evaluation of 
Muslim personal law in order to conform it to constitutional demands of human 
dignity, equality and freedom. This task would be difficult if not impossible to 
achieve for a variety of reasons. In the first place Muslims argue that Muslim personal 
law has a divine character which renders it immutable.117
                                                 
114  See Rautenbach and Du Plessis 2000 THRHR 313. 
 Secondly, various schools 
of Islamic thought exist. Which school or schools must be recognised in South 
115  This is proposed by Moosa 1995 Stell LR 424. 
116  The recognition of Muslim personal law could be delayed until codification has been finalised or 
a phased approach could be followed. The latter approach entails the recognition of partly 
codified Muslim personal law after the finalisation of each phase. 
117  Faridi Islamic Personal Law 123-127. Some writers take a more liberal view. According to them, 
Muslim law consists of secular and religious elements. The religious element includes the five 
basic concepts of Islam, which are immutable and may not be changed. These concepts include 
Kalima (the unity of God and the prophetic character of God), Namaz (prayer five times a day), 
Ramajdan (feasting during certain days), Zakkadh (charity to the poor) and Jajj (pilgrimage to the 
holy city of Mekka). The secular element includes, inter alia, the law of crimes, the law of 
evidence, the law of marriage, the law of contract and the law of succession. These matters are 
susceptible to change and may be altered. Rathnapaki Uniform Civil Code 11-16. 
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Africa?118 Furthermore, the classic Muslim personal law has been modified in various 
dominant Muslim countries.119
Although the codification of Muslim personal law would obviate some of the 
criticisms raised in the previous proposal, the recognition of codified Muslim personal 
law would give rise to a plurality of legal systems, which has its own unique 
problems.
 Which of the many schools of which of the many 
versions of Muslim personal law (classic or reformed Muslim personal law) must be 
recognised in South Africa? Also, which branches of Muslim personal law should be 
recognised (for example the law of marriage, divorce and succession)?  
120
Other issues that must also be dealt with have to do with the conflict of laws. If 
Muslim personal law is recognised, persons should have the choice to opt for Muslim 
personal law or the law of South Africa. Problems regarding choice of law include 
questions such as: Who would have the option to choose Muslim personal law? At 
what stage (or age) can one choose Muslim personal law? What law would be 
applicable when one party to a marriage chooses Muslim personal law and the other 
South African law? Which law will be applicable to the children of a Muslim couple? 
Which law will be applicable when co-habitees (one Muslim and one non-Muslim) 
live together or have children? What will the position be if a Muslim wants to alter his 
choice after he or she has chosen Muslim personal law? Would Muslim personal law 
be the birthright of each Muslim or not? What would happen to Muslims who were 
 However plausible, South Africa should be cautious of a plurality of 
legal systems. Experience in other countries has shown that such a model leads to 
conflict and legal uncertainty. India, which has a Muslim minority of approximately 
11½%, has a secular system of law that gives recognition to a variety of legal systems. 
As already stated, the seemingly blissful co-existence of the various legal systems 
leads to conflict and uncertainty and, in some instances, to the detriment of women 
living in India. Courts are often so caught up in issues dealing with conflict of laws 
that the real issues disappear in a mist of confusion and perplexity.  
                                                 
118  The conflicts arising from the various denominations in Islam are clearly illustrated in Mohamed 
v Jassiem 1996 1 SA 673 (A). 
119  Mahmood Statutes of Personal Law 3 et seq. 
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not born in SA? These are only a few of the issues that need to be addressed when a 
legal system decides on a plurality of legal systems.  
The India experience has also shown that the co-existence of various legal systems 
might lead to so-called "personal law shopping." The following scenario may serve as 
an example: Two Hindus concluded a civil marriage in terms of the common law. The 
husband wants to conclude a second marriage, but in terms of the common law 
polygany is prohibited. However, in terms of Muslim personal law, polygany is 
permitted. What will happen if the husband converts to Islam in order to conclude a 
second Islamic marriage? And also, which legal system will apply to the first and 
which to the second marriage?121
6  Harmonisation of Muslim personal law with the common law 
  
 
Another possibility, which could circumvent some of the shortcomings of the 
previous models, is to harmonise Muslim personal law with the common law. The 
harmonisation of the common law with other legal systems is not a new idea. The 
initial aim of the South African Law Reform Commission in their report on the 
Harmonisation of the Common Law and the Indigenous Law122 was to create "a 
uniform code of marriage law that would be applicable to all South Africans". The 
idea might be appalling to the adherents of religious legal systems.123
It is argued that the submissions of the United Ulema Council of South Africa that a 
phased approached regarding the recognition of Muslim personal law should be 
 However, the 
alternative, of which India is a good example, is equally atrocious.  
                                                                                                                                            
120  Sinclair Law of Marriage 211-213. 
121  The prevailing circumstances in terms of customary law (the so-called discarded wife) also serve 
as an example of the difficulties that may be experienced if there is more than one legal system in 
operation.  
122  SALC Harmonisation of the Common Law and the Indigenous Law 8. 
123  According to Labuschagne 1991 THRHR 846 uniformity will follow when human autonomy and 
deregulation of the marriage is recognised.  
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followed.124
(a) The enactment of the Marriage Act, Extension Act.
 It is suggested, therefore, that consideration should be given to piecemeal 
legislation recognising the various branches of Muslim personal law in phases. One of 
the branches that need urgent attention is the law of marriage. It is submitted that the 
current investigation of the South African Law Reform Commission should be done 
in conjunction with the existing developments taking place regarding the common law 
and customary law. These developments include: 
125
(b) The investigation being done by the South African Law Reform 
Commission on the harmonisation of the common law and the 
indigenous law.
 
126
(c) The enactment of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.
 
127
(d) The investigation being done by the South African Law Reform 
Commission on Islamic marriages.
 
128
(e) The investigation being done by the South African Law Reform 
Commission on the Marriage Act.
 
129
It is submitted that a secular marriage code that makes provision for a set of minimum 
requirements (dealing with the secular elements of a marriage such as age of consent, 
actual consent, marriage officers and registration of marriage) for all in South Africa 
should be considered. The celebration of the marriage could then take place according 
tot the religious or cultural preferences of the parties.
  
130
                                                 
124  The United Ulema Council of South Africa is a body that consists of the major Ulema formations 
of South Africa. Their main objective is to act as a spokesperson for the Muslim community on 
national and international issues. See the submissions of the UUCSA contained in annexure C2 to 
the minutes of the meeting of the SALC 's workshop on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters 
held in Pretoria on 8 March 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the Minutes of 8 March 1997). 
 Such a step would ensure 
125  Marriage Act, Extension Act 50 of 1997. The act is retroactive from 27 April 1994 and extends 
the operation of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 to the whole of South Africa. 
126  SALC Report on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters 8 et seq. 
127  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. The act came into operation on 15 
November 2000. 
128  SALC Islamic Marriages and Related Matters http://www.law.wits.ac.za/salc/issue/ip15.pdf 1 
Nov. 
129  South African Law Reform Commission on the Marriage Act 25 of 1961. SALC Review of the 
Marriage Act Discussion Paper 88. 
130  SALC Report on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters 17. 
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equality for all South Africans before the law, whilst acknowledging cultural and 
religious differences; legal certainty; and the introduction of legislation to ensure that 
women are dealt with on an equal basis and not discriminated against within the 
privacy of a legal system that is excluded from the scrutiny of the Bill of Rights. 
It is submitted that a previous proposal of the South African Law Reform 
Commission that a "marriage is an institution common to all cultures, all marriages no 
matter what their particular forms would exhibit certain broad similarities" is correct. 
It is therefore logical that a common code of marriage law for all South Africans 
should be developed.131 In order to give intermediate relief to the hardships caused by 
the non-recognition of Islamic marriages, consideration should be given to amending 
the Marriage Act to facilitate the recognition of Islamic marriages.132
Another issue that needs do be dealt with before recognition is given concerns with 
the obvious conflict between some rights and values contained in the Constitution. 
The Constitution of South Africa prohibits, among other things, discrimination on the 
grounds of sex and gender. On the face of it, Muslim law discriminates against 
 
                                                 
131  Ibid 8, 17. Although the SALC proposed separate legislation for the recognition of customary 
marriages they did not abandon their initial aim to investigate a single unified marriage code. 
They recognised the fact that their investigation might influence investigations into other 
unrecognised unions, such as Hindu and Islamic marriages, but in the light of urgent reform 
regarding customary marriages, it was decided to go ahead with their proposal to have customary 
marriages recognised. As a result of their proposals the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
120 of 1998 was enacted. 
132  Whether the same recognition should be afforded to polygamous Islamic marriages is a debate 
that falls outside the scope of this discussion. It is sufficient to point out that it is rather a question 
of polygyny than polygamy, because women are not allowed to marry more than one husband. 
The objections of Western scholars to polygyny are primarily based on religious grounds (Bronn 
v Fritz Bronn's Executors (1860) 3 Searle 313 318-333; Seedat's Executors v The Master (Natal) 
1917 AD 302 307-308). In Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C) 707E it was pointed out that "it is 
quite inimical to all the values of the new South Africa for one group to impose its values on 
another". There is, however, another reason why polygyny should be treated with suspicion, and 
that concerns the issue whether polygyny discriminates against women. The answer to the 
question requires, inter alia, a balancing of competing values and rights such as equality, human 
dignity and religious and culture-based rights. It has already been argued that equality should 
prevail over cultural and religion-based rights. Furthermore, polygyny is one of the characteristics 
of a patriarchal family system (see Sinclair Law of Marriage 167). One of the aims of the 
Promotion and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 is to eradicate inequalities 
caused by patriarchy. It may also be argued that the recognition of polygyny between adherents of 
one legal system discriminates against adherents of another legal system, which prohibits 
polygyny. It is doubtful whether polygyny would escape the scrutiny of the Constitution and the 
Promotion and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
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females on various grounds. The half-share that benefits Muslim men in terms of the 
law of succession is but one example of discrimination against women that needs to 
be developed.133
In response, religious communities argue that the Constitution guarantees the practise 
of religion and culture free from interference. This obvious conflict between certain 
provisions of the Constitution has to be resolved before Muslim personal law can be 
recognised. Furthermore, discriminatory rules of Muslim personal law have to be 
reformed before recognition could be given to Muslim personal law. There is no 
doubt that some Muslims would only be satisfied with full recognition of their 
Muslim personal law, and there is little doubt that they will be satisfied with anything 
less. But they should consider codifying and reforming their personal law first, and 
then take something concrete to the legislature to consider.
  
134
7 Conclusion 
 
 
A plurality of personal laws in South Africa should be prevented as far as possible. 
The South African system should be developed to accommodate the religious and 
cultural diversity of the country. Up to now many religious practices, such as religious 
marriages, were condemned by the courts and legislature due to their potentially 
polygynous nature. It will be very difficult for the government to substantiate why 
recognition is given to polygynous customary marriages whilst polygynous religious 
marriages are invalid due to their potentially polygynous nature. Although, at present, 
it is mainly the Muslim community that demands the recognition of Muslim personal 
law, the possibility that other religious communities in South Africa will soon follow 
is not excluded.  
                                                 
133  These issues are discussed in Rautenbach 2003 QUTLJJ 172-180. But see, Goolam 2001 Stell LR 
199. 
134  Poulter Separate Islamic System 165. 
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It is important to recognise and debate the issues regarding the recognition of 
religious legal systems from the onset. In doing so, it is important to reflect on the 
legal and social position of women within these legal systems before any legislative 
recognition is given to personal legal systems that discriminate against women.  
The Draft Bill alleviates some of the problems experienced by Muslim couples as a 
result of the non-recognition of their marriages in South Africa. However, if the Draft 
Bill is enacted into legislation and it does not receive universal support from the 
Muslim community in South Africa, it will become mere paper law.  
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